libFuzzer targets for the parsers on the security pages (#307). Each target
feeds one input to a parser from parsers.hpp (the same code
docs/security/parsing-and-validation.md
and bounds.md show) and checks the properties
the page promises; a broken property aborts, which libFuzzer reports as a
crash. The targets live in targets.hpp.
| Target | Parser | Property checked |
|---|---|---|
fuzz_parse_port |
parse_port |
an accepted port is 1–65535 and spelled exactly as its digits (no second spelling) |
fuzz_payload |
payload |
an accepted payload has the claimed length and lies inside the packet |
fuzz_nesting |
nesting |
an accepted string is balanced and no deeper than the limit |
cmake --preset clang-22 -B build/fuzz -DCPPDOCS_FUZZ=ON -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo
cmake --build build/fuzz --target fuzz_targets
tools/ci/fuzz.sh 60 # each target for 60 s on a copy of its corpusThe targets are built with -fsanitize=fuzzer,address,undefined
(fuzzer,address on Apple: Homebrew LLVM 22's objects with UBSan don't link
with the macOS 14 system linker). The CI job (fuzz in
.github/workflows/linux.yml) runs each for 120 s with Clang 22 whenever the
tests run, and uploads any failing input.
corpus/<target>/ holds seed inputs and every minimized failing input, kept as
regression cases. tests/security/fuzz_corpus_test.cpp replays all of them
through the same targets on every platform and compiler, without libFuzzer.
When a run finds a crash: fix the code, minimize the input
(fuzz_<target> -minimize_crash=1 -runs=10000 <input>), and save it in
corpus/<target>/ with a name that says what it is.
The first run of fuzz_parse_port found that parse_port accepted "05"
as 5, a second spelling of the same port; the parser now rejects leading
zeros, and corpus/parse_port/leading-zero keeps the input.
Fuzzing time says nothing about what was reached; coverage does. Replay a
corpus through a coverage build and read the branch counts (the commands are
in verification).
The first check, #301, found that no saved input reached payload's
"claimed length too long" rejection (too-long claimed exactly the bytes
available) or parse_port's check for values above 65535. too-long was
corrected and above-max added; tests/security/verification_test.cpp
keeps each rejection reached.