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fix(#7511): refuse a group or API-token change a cluster peer cannot decode - #7555
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…decode #7373 added SECURITY_GROUPS_ENTRY (id 7) and SECURITY_API_TOKENS_ENTRY (id 8). A node predating them cannot decode either, and ArcadeStateMachine halts rather than skip a committed entry it cannot read (the #4798 rule). During a rolling upgrade the cluster is mixed by construction, so creating a group or minting a token on an already-upgraded node halted every node still on the old build, with nothing saying the cluster was not ready for it. The halt stays. What changes is that the entry is no longer written while a peer cannot read it: the two types are gated on the #7219 peer-capability handshake - two new permanent tokens, security-groups-entry and security-api-tokens-entry - and the operation is refused instead, HTTP 409 / gRPC FAILED_PRECONDITION, naming the lagging peer and why its answer is missing. Nothing is submitted, so nothing halts, and the request succeeds unchanged once the last node is up. Unlike #7219's schema delta there is no degraded mode to fall back to, so the "no" has to be a refusal. Two consequences that shaped the design: - The gate cannot read the leader-only capability cache. The group and API-token REST routes do not forward, so those operations run on whichever node the client hit; peersMissingCapabilityNow reads the cache first and runs one bounded probe round only when it is not already a full yes. - Every unknown is a no, which refuses while a peer is DOWN and not only while it is OLD - revocations included. arcadedb.ha.securityEntryCapabilityGate (default true) is the escape hatch, and the refusal message names it. SecurityEntryCapabilityGate.capabilityFor is an exhaustive switch over RaftLogEntryType with no default, so a ninth entry type does not compile until someone decides whether it needs a token. Closes #7511 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PEJXCdUGW61QSXqyurphpt
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 4 included reviews per hour; 1 remains after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change gates security group and API-token Raft entries on peer capabilities during rolling upgrades. It adds configuration control, synchronous capability probing, refusal status mappings, bounded refusal details, logging controls, and unit, integration, and security-state tests. ChangesSecurity entry capability gating
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Change: Bug fix · Severity of issue fixed: Medium Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant AdminClient
participant RaftHAPlugin
participant SecurityEntryCapabilityGate
participant RaftHAServer
participant RaftTransactionBroker
AdminClient->>RaftHAPlugin: Request group or API-token change
RaftHAPlugin->>SecurityEntryCapabilityGate: Check entry capability
SecurityEntryCapabilityGate->>RaftHAServer: Refresh and inspect peer capabilities
alt Every peer supports the entry
SecurityEntryCapabilityGate-->>RaftHAPlugin: Allow
RaftHAPlugin->>RaftTransactionBroker: Submit Raft entry
else A peer lacks the capability
SecurityEntryCapabilityGate-->>RaftHAPlugin: ClusterCapabilityNotReadyException
RaftHAPlugin-->>AdminClient: HTTP 409 or gRPC FAILED_PRECONDITION
end
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The capability gate and refusal mappings cover the rolling-upgrade safety path without an identified unresolved merge risk. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 47.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 100 functions across 13 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.)
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Up to standards ✅🟢 Issues
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| Metric | Results |
|---|---|
| Complexity | 37 |
🟢 Coverage 97.59% diff coverage · -6.32% coverage variation
Metric Results Coverage variation ✅ -6.32% coverage variation Diff coverage ✅ 97.59% diff coverage Coverage variation details
Coverable lines Covered lines Coverage Common ancestor commit (99b6692) 179493 148071 82.49% Head commit (32dcbf9) 212114 (+32621) 161579 (+13508) 76.18% (-6.32%) Coverage variation is the difference between the coverage for the head and common ancestor commits of the pull request branch:
<coverage of head commit> - <coverage of common ancestor commit>Diff coverage details
Coverable lines Covered lines Diff coverage Pull request (#7555) 83 81 97.59% Diff coverage is the percentage of lines that are covered by tests out of the coverable lines that the pull request added or modified:
<covered lines added or modified>/<coverable lines added or modified> * 100%
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Review: fix(#7511) - refuse a group/API-token change a cluster peer cannot decodeI read through the full diff (docs + SummarySolid fix, and unusually well self-documented (the design doc,
Minor observations (non-blocking)
Test coverageThe four new test classes match what the description claims: Nits
Nothing here blocks merging as far as I can tell from static review; the two observations above are things to keep an eye on operationally rather than defects. |
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Inline comments:
In
`@server/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/server/http/handler/AbstractServerHttpHandler.java`:
- Line 761: Update the cluster-not-ready branch in AbstractServerHttpHandler to
pass a bounded exceptionArgs value containing the incompatible peer and
capability reason instead of null, so production buildErrorBody responses retain
those details. Extend the relevant test to use production SERVER_MODE and assert
the 409 response includes both the peer and reason.
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docs/7511-ha-rolling-upgrade-security-entry-capability-gate.mdengine/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/GlobalConfiguration.javagrpcw/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/server/grpc/ArcadeDbGrpcAdminService.javagrpcw/src/test/java/com/arcadedb/server/grpc/Issue7511GrpcClusterNotReadyStatusTest.javaha-raft/CLAUDE.mdha-raft/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/server/ha/raft/PeerCapabilities.javaha-raft/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/server/ha/raft/RaftHAPlugin.javaha-raft/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/server/ha/raft/RaftHAServer.javaha-raft/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/server/ha/raft/SecurityEntryCapabilityGate.javaha-raft/src/test/java/com/arcadedb/server/ha/raft/Issue7511MixedVersionSecurityEntryIT.javaha-raft/src/test/java/com/arcadedb/server/ha/raft/Issue7511SecurityEntryCapabilityGateTest.javaserver/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/server/ClusterCapabilityNotReadyException.javaserver/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/server/http/handler/AbstractServerHttpHandler.javaserver/src/test/java/com/arcadedb/server/http/handler/Issue7511ClusterNotReadyHttpStatusTest.javaserver/src/test/java/com/arcadedb/server/security/Issue7511SecurityEntryGateRefusalTest.java
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…n 409
CodeRabbit, Major: buildErrorBody emits 'detail' only outside production mode,
and the 409 arm passed null as exceptionArgs - so on a production server the
whole refusal reached the client as {"error":"Cluster is not ready for this
operation"}, naming neither the lagging peer nor the capability. That is the
silence #7511 exists to end, one mode over.
ClusterCapabilityNotReadyException now carries the capability and the missing
peers as fields, and toExceptionArgs() renders them as
'security-groups-entry|arcadedb2[,+N more]' - pipe-separated like
DuplicatedKeyException's, capped at five peers - which every mode emits. Not the
suggested getMessage(): exceptionArgs is a wire contract documented as bounded
and non-sensitive, and the per-peer reasons are free-form probe-failure text that
can carry a host, a port or a JDK exception message, which is what 'detail' is
concealed for in the first place.
Also from the review, no behaviour change: peersMissingCapabilityNow logs the
on-demand round at FINE with its elapsed time and outcome, so the one stall this
feature can add is attributable; and both javadocs now say the ServerSecurity
monitor held across it is shared with USER administration, and why overlapping
the leader's background round is safe rather than locked out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PEJXCdUGW61QSXqyurphpt
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Review Went through the core mechanism ( Code quality / design
Potential concerns worth a second look
Test coverage Security Minor nit Nice work on the documentation trail (coverage table, adversarial-pass disposition table, review-cycle log) - it made this much faster to review with confidence. |
claude's cycle-2 review: the FINE line added in cycle 1 reports every on-demand
capability round, but the case an operator most needs surfaced - the round found
a peer missing and the change was refused - deserves a WARNING rather than a
verbosity crank. The caller may be a deployment script that swallows the 409;
the operator watching the rolling upgrade is the one who has to act on it.
Throttled per capability at 60s, so that script's retry loop cannot bury the
line, and per capability rather than globally so a group refusal does not silence
the token refusal behind it. shouldLogRefusal takes the clock so the decision is
pinned without sleeping.
Its other three notes needed no code: the availability trade and the downgrade
boundary are documented already, and PostAddPeerHandler already surfaces a failed
security seed both in the addPeer response ('warning') and as a WARNING naming
the peer - verified at lines 74-89 rather than assumed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PEJXCdUGW61QSXqyurphpt
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Review summary: This is an exceptionally well-scoped and well-tested fix for a real operational hazard (a routine group/API-token admin action during a rolling upgrade committing a Raft entry type an old peer cannot decode, which halts it per the #4798 rule). I read through the diff, the ha-raft/CLAUDE.md update, and the PR's own adversarial-pass/review-cycle notes, and traced the actual source (not just the diff) for the parts that mattered most. Design / correctness:
Performance:
Security:
Test coverage: Thorough. Unit tests for the gate decision, refusal text, and exhaustive switch; a removing-the-gate-call falsification check that turns exactly two tests red; HTTP and gRPC status-mapping tests (including the catch-order and production-mode redaction cases); and a real 3-node slow-tagged IT that exercises both the leader and an upgraded-follower refusal path and confirms convergence once the lagging node upgrades. This is above the bar I would normally expect and directly follows the repo's TDD and regression-test conventions. Minor, non-blocking notes:
Nothing here blocks merge. Nice work tracing every writer of the two entry types and building a mechanism (the exhaustive switch) that outlives this specific issue rather than a one-off patch. |
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PEJXCdUGW61QSXqyurphpt
ReviewThis is an unusually well-documented and thoroughly self-reviewed PR (three review cycles, an adversarial pass, and Correctness - verified independently
Minor observations (non-blocking)
Test coverageThe test matrix (unit tests for the gate/tokens/switch exhaustiveness, HTTP status mapping, gRPC status mapping, an operator-facing-entry-point suite that pins "no half-change," and a real 3-node OverallNo blocking issues found. The design correctly distinguishes this case (an entry type with no degraded mode) from #7219's schema-delta section (which does have one), the escape-hatch setting and its trade-offs are documented in three places consistently (Javadoc, |
Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #7555 +/- ##
==========================================
+ Coverage 74.03% 74.07% +0.04%
==========================================
Files 1961 1963 +2
Lines 179493 179711 +218
Branches 37856 37907 +51
==========================================
+ Hits 132892 133128 +236
+ Misses 31459 31407 -52
- Partials 15142 15176 +34 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Harness. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
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Closes #7511
Summary
#7373 added two Raft log entry types,
SECURITY_GROUPS_ENTRY(id 7) andSECURITY_API_TOKENS_ENTRY(id 8). Anode predating them cannot decode either, and
ArcadeStateMachinehalts rather than skip a committed entry itcannot read - correctly, because skipping would diverge the cluster's security state silently (the #4798 rule).
During a rolling upgrade the cluster is mixed by construction, so creating a group or minting an API token against
an already-upgraded node committed an entry that halted every node still on the old build: a routine admin action,
on a routine upgrade, turned into a partial outage, with nothing in the API response saying the cluster was not
ready for it. The halt stays. What this changes is that the entry is no longer written while a peer cannot read
it: the two types are gated on the #7219 peer-capability handshake - two new permanent tokens,
security-groups-entryandsecurity-api-tokens-entry, advertised overPOST /api/v1/cluster/capabilities- andthe operation is refused instead, HTTP
409 Conflict/ gRPCFAILED_PRECONDITION, naming the lagging peer and thereason its answer is missing. Nothing is submitted, so nothing halts, and the same request succeeds unchanged once
the last node is up, with no sequencing by hand.
Why a refusal rather than a fallback, and the two consequences that shaped it
#7219 negotiates an optional section of
SCHEMA_ENTRY, so its "no" degrades to shipping the whole document. Anentry type has no degraded mode: the entry either goes in and halts the old peer, or it does not go in at all.
That difference drove two decisions worth reviewing carefully:
(
startCapabilityMonitoris called fromstartLagMonitor), but the group and API-token REST routes do notforward to the leader -
PostGroupHandlercallsServerControlPlanedirectly - so those operations run onwhichever node the client or load balancer picked and submit through a Raft client that routes to the leader. A
refusal built on
peersMissingCapabilityalone would therefore refuse every group change ever made on afollower, on a perfectly healthy single-version cluster.
RaftHAServer.peersMissingCapabilityNowreads the cachefirst and runs one bounded probe round (sequential,
PROBE_TIMEOUT_MSper peer) only when that is not already afull "yes". The integration test drives exactly this arm.
404-or-timeout at the transport, which is what makes the gate safe - and also means an admin change is refused
while any node is DOWN, not only while any node is OLD, revocations included.
arcadedb.ha.securityEntryCapabilityGate(defaulttrue) is the escape hatch for an operator who knows fromoutside the cluster that the unreachable node understands the entry; the refusal message names it.
SecurityEntryCapabilityGate.capabilityForis an exhaustiveswitchoverRaftLogEntryTypewith nodefault, soadding a ninth entry type does not compile until whoever adds it decides whether it needs a token - the issue
asked for a mechanism that "would cover the next entry type too", and a switch that fails the build is a stronger
guarantee than a sentence in a document.
ha-raft/CLAUDE.mdgains the section that says so.Test plan
mvn -o -pl ha-raft -am test -Dtest=Issue7511SecurityEntryCapabilityGateTest- 16 tests: the tokens andtheir permanent spellings,
capabilityForover everyRaftLogEntryTypevalue, the decision (all-capable,one missing, no configuration readable, interlock off), the refusal text, and - through
RaftHAPlugin.replicateSecurityGroups/replicateSecurityApiTokenswith a mocked broker - that a refusalhands the transaction broker nothing.
mvn -o -pl server -am test -Dtest=Issue7511SecurityEntryGateRefusalTest- 7 tests, one per operator-facingentry point (save/delete group, mint/revoke token, the
addPeerseed), each asserting both that the refusalpropagates and that the node serving it kept no half-change.
mvn -o -pl server -am test -Dtest=Issue7511ClusterNotReadyHttpStatusTest- the 409, wrapped and unwrapped,plus the catch-order guard that a plain
OperationNotAvailableExceptionis not swept into it.mvn -o -pl grpcw -am test -Dtest=Issue7511GrpcClusterNotReadyStatusTest- theFAILED_PRECONDITIONthroughArcadeDbGrpcAdminService.toStatus, the mapper every admin RPC delegates to.mvn -o -pl ha-raft -am verify -DskipITs=false -Dit.test=Issue7511MixedVersionSecurityEntryIT- a real3-node cluster with one node advertising a pre-HA: groups and API tokens are node-local while users are replicated #7373 capability set: the leader refuses, an upgraded
follower refuses by asking the peers itself, the lagging node is still running, and the change goes through
and converges on all three once it finishes "upgrading". 21 s,
@Tag("slow").RaftHAPluginmethods, exactly the two caller unittests go red and the IT fails with "Expecting code to raise a throwable" on both the leader and the follower
arm. Nothing else moved, so the tests are not passing for another reason.
ha-raft144 (the whole HA: no peer-capability negotiation, so arcadedb.ha.schemaDelta is unsafe to enable without an operator getting the rolling-upgrade order right #7219/HA: a cluster with ambiguous derived HTTP addresses can never negotiate peer capabilities, so schema deltas are unreachable there #7256/Follow-up to #7219: /api/v1/cluster on a follower publishes the follower's own capabilities under the leader's row, defeating the field's stated purpose during a rolling upgrade #7301/Follow-up to #7256: capability probe failures are buffered until after pass 2, so a peer that just answered 404 is still believed capable and can be sent a schema delta it cannot decode #7331/Four low-severity leftovers: JSONL get() outside the #7269 alignment, the #7256 shared-endpoint recovery dead on its own target shape, pass 2 still dropping a failure reason, and two profiler presentation gaps #7332/HA: groups and API tokens are node-local while users are replicated #7373/Raft log entries carry no version field and only SCHEMA_ENTRY tolerates trailing bytes, so adding one field to any other entry type halts every non-upgraded peer during a rolling upgrade #7138 capability and codec set),serversecurity package 89 (includingIssue7373ClusterWideGroupsAndTokensTest),engineconfiguration79,
grpcwstatus mapping 4. All green.Coverage
Every submit of entry types 7 and 8 funnels through
RaftHAPlugin.replicateSecurityGroups/replicateSecurityApiTokens- verified exhaustively:RaftHAPluginis the onlyHAServerPluginimplementation insrc/mainand the only caller of the broker's two security-config methods. The gate sits there, so one gate coversevery entry point:
POST /api/v1/server/groups->ServerControlPlane.saveGroup->saveGroupClusterWideDELETE /api/v1/server/groups->deleteGroupClusterWideSaveGroup/DeleteGroupPOST /api/v1/server/api-tokens->createApiTokenClusterWideDELETE /api/v1/server/api-tokens->deleteApiTokenClusterWideCreateApiToken/DeleteApiTokenPOST /api/v1/cluster/addPeer->seedSecurityStateClusterWide(groups + token halves)SECURITY_USERS_ENTRY(id 5)BOOTSTRAP_FINGERPRINT_ENTRY(id 6)git tag --contains), written only at first cluster formation, where refusing would stop the cluster forming rather than protect a peer. Pinned by the exhaustive switchSCHEMA_ENTRYdelta sectionKnown gaps
does not surface the per-peer
capabilitiesthe cluster payload already returns.GET /api/v1/clusterreports peer capabilities only from the leader, so a rolling-upgrade readinesscheck has to locate the leader first. This PR works around it at the point of use (the on-demand probe) but not
for observability.
hatch is the new setting and the refusal names it.
addPeernow reports a refused groups/API-token seed instead of silently submitting one. Reported, not thrown,and the users seed still goes through; what admitting such a peer means is already tracked by HA addPeer: a peer whose security seed failed is admitted and serves traffic with its own stale credentials #7521.
never what is already committed, and the node in trouble is the one without the check. The same boundary HA: peer-capability negotiation does not protect a node replaying schema-delta entries already committed to the Raft log #7255
documents for schema deltas, now covering entry types too;
ha-raft/CLAUDE.mdsays so.Note on process
The orchestrator's adversarial pass is meant to run in an independent subagent. The
Tasktool was disabled inthis session, so the pass was run by the author instead - which removes its main value. Its eight findings, each
checked against the tree, and their dispositions are in
docs/7511-ha-rolling-upgrade-security-entry-capability-gate.md; two of them became #7548 and #7549.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01PEJXCdUGW61QSXqyurphpt
Summary by CodeRabbit
FAILED_PRECONDITION.