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There's discussion about moving away from relying solely on Remote Attestation TLS (RATLS) and considering alternative approaches for secure communication between services.
Current Approach
Currently using RATLS for several services:
KMS: onboarding RPC, key providing RPC
tproxy: registering RPC
CVM: Inter-App Secure Communication (WIP)
Concerns
Performance issues with RATLS (~1s for Azure to establish connection, longer if PCCS fetch needed)
RATLS hides some implementation details which may be less transparent
Alternative Approaches
Application-level attestation: Exchange regular TLS certificates along with their attestations
Pre-registration approach: Have each KMS instance register locally generated TLS cert+attestation on boot
Considerations
Remote attestation must happen at some level (TLS, HTTP, or Application)
TLS-level attestation is easier to abstract and reuse across services
Application-level attestation makes the security more visible but requires additional MITM protections
Performance is critical for inter-app communication, less so for registration/onboarding
Activity
h4x3rotab commentedon Jun 30, 2026
Maintainer triage update: this remains open intentionally and is listed separately from vulnerability reports in the security roadmap/hardening table: https://github.com/Dstack-TEE/dstack/blob/master/docs/security/public-security-reports.md#related-security-roadmap-and-hardening
Disposition: architecture roadmap. This tracks possible application-level attestation or pre-registration alternatives to RA-TLS.