Harden interior net filtering rules #175

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1. Bowei Du (bowei)

   self-assigned this

   on Jun 4, 2026
2. Bowei Du (bowei)

   added

   kind/featureAn enhancement / feature request or implementationAn enhancement / feature request or implementation

   prio/P0Highest priority / required for next milestoneHighest priority / required for next milestone

   area/network

   on Jun 4, 2026
3. EItanya commented on Jun 4, 2026

   

   Eitan Yarmush (EItanya)

   on Jun 4, 2026

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   This will be easier with #110

   👍React with 👍1Reacted by Nina Polshakova
4. Zheng Lammerts (zlammerts-svg)

   added this to the Alpha (technical viability) milestone on Jun 15, 2026
5. Zheng Lammerts (zlammerts-svg)

   added this to Substrate Milestones (go/substrate-milestones)on Jul 9, 2026
6. github-project-automation

   moved this to Todo in Substrate Milestones (go/substrate-milestones)on Jul 9, 2026
7. Zheng Lammerts (zlammerts-svg)

   modified the milestones: M1 (technical viability), M2 on Jul 23, 2026
8. haiyanmeng commented on Jul 27, 2026

   

   haiyanmeng

   on Jul 27, 2026

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   /assign haiyanmeng
9. haiyanmeng

   assigned

   haiyanmeng

   and unassigned

   Bowei Du (bowei)

   on Jul 27, 2026
10. haiyanmeng commented on Jul 28, 2026

    

    haiyanmeng

    on Jul 28, 2026

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    Here are the things we can do to isolate an actor from the node:

    1. Anti-Spoofing: Drop any packet where the source IP is NOT 169.254.17.2 (the interior IP address assigned to the actor's sandbox).
    2. Drop Localhost: Drop egress traffic destined for 127.0.0.0/8.
    3. Drop Multicast/Broadcast: Drop egress traffic destined for 224.0.0.0/4 and 255.255.255.255/32.
    4. Drop Instance Metadata: Drop traffic destined to 169.254.169.254.
    5. Drop Kubernetes Node Ports: Drop TCP and UDP traffic with destination ports falling within the configurable nodePortStart-nodePortEnd range.
    6. Drop Pod IP: Drop all egress traffic destined directly for the worker pod's IP (podIP) to isolate the actor from ateom's internal services.
    7. Drop Cluster CIDR: If clusterCIDR is provided, drop all egress traffic destined for that network block to prevent lateral movement across the cluster.

    Bowei Du (@bowei) , what do you think?

    Even after Tunneling Gateway is implemented, we can still keep these nftables rules as a Defense in Depth safeguard. Right?
11. Benjamin Elder (BenTheElder)

    added a commit that references this issue on Jul 29, 2026

    Refactor ateom networking to shared internal/ateomnet package (#548)

    ...

    c45a0cd
12. haiyanmeng commented on Jul 29, 2026

    

    haiyanmeng

    on Jul 29, 2026

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    #488 added basic network policy for Ingress to Workers
13. Bowei Du (bowei)

    added

    prio/P1Important but not criticalImportant but not critical

    and removed

    prio/P0Highest priority / required for next milestoneHighest priority / required for next milestone

    on Aug 4, 2026
14. bowei commented on Aug 4, 2026

    

    Bowei Du (bowei)

    on Aug 4, 2026

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    Dropping to P1 now that we have a path for Egress and atunnel.
15. EItanya commented on Sep 23, 2026

    

    Eitan Yarmush (EItanya)

    on Sep 23, 2026

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    Should we close this issues as a lot of work has been done since to change this whole system, including the recent rework from Benjamin Elder (@BenTheElder)

    👍React with 👍1Reacted by Benjamin Elder
16. Bowei Du (bowei)

    closed this as completedon Sep 23, 2026
17. github-project-automation

    moved this from Todo to Done in Substrate Milestones (go/substrate-milestones)on Sep 23, 2026