Please do not open a public issue for security problems. Instead use GitHub private vulnerability reporting on this repository, or contact the maintainers at hello@interu.ai. We aim to acknowledge reports within 7 days.

This plugin composes a URL of the form:

<your-a0-origin>/?ctxid=<chat-context-id>

and copies it to the clipboard. Being honest about the security properties:

• It is not a capability/bearer token. The ctxid grants no access by itself. A recipient must (a) have network reachability to your Agent Zero instance and (b) pass its authentication (login / auth proxy). Unauthenticated visitors land on the login screen.
• It is not a public share page. There is no anonymous read-only render, no proxy, no third-party service. The plugin has zero backend and stores nothing.
• Nothing leaves your machine on click. Link composition and the clipboard write are entirely client-side (navigator.clipboard, with a hidden-textarea execCommand fallback).

• Token entropy / guessability of ctxid: Agent Zero chat context ids are short (~8 char) random ids generated client- or server-side. They are identifiers, not secrets — Agent Zero's security boundary is its authentication layer, not ctxid secrecy. Anyone already authenticated to the same instance could enumerate or guess chat ids; the plugin does not change that pre-existing property.
• Exposure surface = your instance's exposure. If your A0 instance is exposed on a LAN or the internet without auth, the link points anyone straight at your conversation. That risk exists with or without this plugin — the plugin just makes the URL easier to produce. Run A0 behind authentication (built-in login, reverse-proxy auth, VPN).
• The URL itself leaks metadata. A pasted link reveals your instance origin (hostname/port) and one chat id to whoever can read the paste destination (chat logs, issue trackers). Treat links like you treat internal URLs.
• Clipboard is a shared surface. Anything on the clipboard can be read by other local applications with clipboard access. The confirmation state ("Link copied!") auto-reverts after ~2s but the clipboard content persists until overwritten.

• No secrets embedded in links; existing query params are stripped before ctxid is set (prevents accidentally re-sharing tokens that were in your current URL).
• No-op when no chat is selected (getContext() falsy → return).
• No network calls, no storage, no server-side component — the audit surface is a single ~150-line declarative HTML file: extensions/webui/chat-top-end/share-chat.html.

Only the latest released version receives security fixes.