Add zizmor workflow security analysis - #72
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Adds a CI job that runs zizmor over .github/ on pushes to main, on pull requests touching .github/, and on demand. Findings are surfaced as annotations on the offending workflow lines and fail the job. Also pins actions/checkout to a commit SHA in the calendar workflow and adds a zizmor config that waives the artipacked finding there: that workflow deliberately reuses the credentials persisted by the checkout to push the refreshed calendar data back to the branch. Generated-by: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RtqKBTSR2jQF7xhHMBpdoy
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Adds zizmor as a CI check over
.github/, soGitHub Actions security problems (script injection, unpinned actions,
over-broad permissions, credential persistence) get caught in review
rather than after the fact.
What's here
.github/workflows/zizmor.yml— runsuvx zizmor@latestover therepo on pushes to
mainthat touch.github/, on PRs that touch.github/, and onworkflow_dispatch. Findings are reported asannotations on the offending workflow lines and fail the job.
The workflow itself is clean:
contents: readonly,persist-credentials: false, and both actions pinned to commit SHAs..github/zizmor.yml— config waiving the one finding that isintentional:
artipackedongetcalendar.yml, which deliberatelyreuses the credentials persisted by
actions/checkoutto push therefreshed calendar data back to the branch.
.github/workflows/getcalendar.yml— pinsactions/checkoutto acommit SHA (v4.4.0) and comments why the persisted credentials are
needed there.
Dependabot (added in #70) will keep the pinned SHAs current.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01RtqKBTSR2jQF7xhHMBpdoy