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feat(sdk): route DAPI connections through a SOCKS5 proxy - #5160
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Included review availability: This review used your included allowance. Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughNative DAPI clients and SDK builders can configure SOCKS5 proxies. The transport supports TCP and Unix-domain proxy endpoints, multiple authentication modes, and separate handling for proxy failures and destination errors. ChangesNative SOCKS5 proxy support
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~50 minutes Change: Feature Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant DapiClient
participant AppliedRequestSettings
participant Socks5Connector
participant SOCKS5Proxy
participant DapiServer
DapiClient->>AppliedRequestSettings: Apply proxy settings
AppliedRequestSettings->>Socks5Connector: Configure proxied channel
Socks5Connector->>SOCKS5Proxy: Negotiate and request destination tunnel
SOCKS5Proxy->>DapiServer: Forward tunneled connection
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The reviewed proxy configuration and connection paths have no established merge-blocking issue. Merge after normal checks. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Configured DAPI traffic remains proxied and retains destination TLS validation, but the new option to use password authentication with a remote TCP proxy can expose proxy credentials on the network. This is an opt-in configuration risk, not a default-path exposure. Retained concerns
Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
Security Findings and Attack Paths
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/proxy.rs:
- Around line 113-123: Update Socks5Proxy::connection_key so fixed-password
credentials contribute a stable, process-randomized identity to the pool key,
distinguishing password changes without including the password or a plain
password digest. Update the connection-key test to verify different fixed
passwords produce different keys while password text remains absent.
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packages/rs-dapi-client/Cargo.tomlpackages/rs-dapi-client/src/dapi_client.rspackages/rs-dapi-client/src/request_settings.rspackages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport.rspackages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/grpc.rspackages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/proxy.rspackages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/tonic_channel.rspackages/rs-dapi-client/tests/data/proxy/README.mdpackages/rs-dapi-client/tests/data/proxy/server.keypackages/rs-dapi-client/tests/rate_limit_ban.rspackages/rs-dapi-client/tests/socks5_proxy.rspackages/rs-sdk/src/sdk.rs
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Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
Three timeout defects are confirmed: short connection deadlines bypass proxy-failure attribution, partial greetings and stalled authentication incorrectly shift blame to the destination, and the executor truncates the default proxy connection budget. These are non-consensus correctness issues, classified as suggestions under the supplied severity policy. The complete rs-dapi-client all-features suite passed; four temporary loopback probes reproduced the reported failures, and the working tree was left unchanged.
🟡 3 suggestion(s)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 3: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 4: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 5: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 6: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 7: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 8: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 9: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 10: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
normalbygpt-6-astra(effort low) — The diff adds substantial SDK transport routing, proxy authentication, timeout and retry handling, and tests, but delegates SOCKS5 parsing to tokio-socks and does not materially change consensus, funds movement, cryptographic primitives or keys, peer-facing deserialization, or storage migrations. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity below 15% reserve: weekly 13% left, 5h 100% left),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Fresh verifier:
gpt-6-astra— final-verifier; agentastra-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— ffi-engineer (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— security-auditor (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/tonic_channel.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/tonic_channel.rs:62-68: Include the proxy connection default in the executor's attempt budget
The 20-second fallback is applied only to the tonic channel; AppliedRequestSettings.connect_timeout remains None. DapiClient::execute wraps the entire attempt, including lazy connection establishment, in attempt_deadline(), which therefore allows only the default 10-second request timeout. A loopback proxy that immediately completed method selection and then held its CONNECT reply produced DeadlineExceeded with 'no complete response within 10s' and banned the destination. Consequently, a connection needing between 10 and 20 seconds cannot use the advertised default connection budget. Resolve the effective proxy connection timeout in shared applied settings and use it for both channel construction and the executor's timeout-plus-connect-timeout calculation. Add an executor-level test without an explicit connect_timeout.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/tonic_channel.rs:64-68: Preserve proxy-failure attribution when the connection timeout expires first
A caller-supplied connect_timeout below the connector's fixed five-second PROXY_ANSWER_TIMEOUT expires in tonic's outer timeout wrapper before the connector can return ProxyError. With a silent loopback proxy and connect_timeout=100ms, the request returned Code::Unknown with a TimedOut source, is_proxy_failure() was false, and the destination was banned even though no CONNECT request had reached the proxy. With multiple addresses and retries, the same proxy outage can consume the address list. Coordinate connection-deadline enforcement with the connector's phase-aware classification so expiry during proxy establishment retains ProxyError, while CONNECT/TLS timeouts retain destination attribution. Cover a silent proxy with a connection budget below five seconds.
In `packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/proxy.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/proxy.rs:189-191: Keep incomplete proxy negotiation classified as a proxy failure
Answered sets its flag after any received byte, and this branch then disables the proxy-response timeout. Receiving only 0x05 does not complete the two-byte method-selection response; receiving [0x05, 0x02] still requires RFC 1929 authentication before tokio-socks sends CONNECT. If the proxy stalls at either point, the outer channel timeout returns an unmarked error and the executor bans a destination that has not been contacted. Independent loopback probes reproduced both cases with seven- and eight-second connection budgets. Track completion of method selection and any required authentication, rather than first socket activity, before switching timeout attribution to the destination. Add coverage for truncated greetings and stalled authentication.
Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (2)
These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.
- create_channel still panics on a hostless URI — Out of scope: the base commit already contains uri.host().expect("Failed to get host from URI") in the same public constructor. This PR strips IPv6 brackets and propagates TLS configuration errors; it neither introduces nor worsens the hostless-URI panic.
- Follow-up: Consider creating a separate issue or author/maintainer-requested PR for this.
- Core RPC (SdkBuilder::with_core) still connects directly when a proxy is set — Explicitly outside the feature's scope: both the PR description and SdkBuilder::with_proxy documentation state that only DAPI connections are tunneled and Core RPC remains direct. Routing or rejecting separate Core RPC connections would expand the documented contract rather than repair this implementation.
- Follow-up: Consider creating a separate issue or author/maintainer-requested PR for this.
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
Verified the complete PR diff at 324dbc9 and confirmed that all three prior findings are fixed. Two nonblocking issues remain, independently reproduced: connection establishment can consume the configured connection budget twice, and TLS configuration errors lose their underlying diagnostic cause. The complete DAPI test suite, SDK proxy-builder test, DAPI WASM check, SDK no-default-features check, and both targeted reproduction probes passed; the worktree remains unchanged.
🟡 2 suggestion(s)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 3: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 4: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 5: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 6: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 7: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 8: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 9: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 10: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 11: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 12: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
normalbygpt-6-astra(effort low) — The substantial change adds SDK proxy routing, authentication, connection pooling and timeout/retry classification in transport/proxy.rs and tonic_channel.rs, but delegates SOCKS5 protocol decoding to tokio-socks and does not clearly meet the specified critical-surface bar. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity below 15% reserve: weekly 13% left, 5h 100% left),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6-astra— final-verifier; agentastra-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— security-auditor (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— security-auditor (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/tonic_channel.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/tonic_channel.rs:59-64: Keep the complete connection deadline owned by the transport
The SOCKS connector receives the entire connect_timeout, and TLS subsequently starts another full timeout of the same duration. This exceeds RequestSettings' documented connection-establishment budget: an independent loopback probe with connect_timeout=1s, the request timeout disabled, and an 800ms CONNECT delay followed by stalled TLS returned after approximately 1.95s. When the request timeout is enabled, the executor bounds the combined attempt but connection establishment can consume the time budget intended for the request; direct create_channel users have no executor bound. Enforce one absolute connection deadline across SOCKS establishment and TLS while preserving phase-aware ProxyError attribution, and add a delayed-CONNECT/stalled-TLS regression test.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/tonic_channel.rs:86: Preserve the underlying TLS configuration error in diagnostics
The locked tonic 0.14.6 transport error displays only its error kind; the underlying cause is stored in its source. Formatting {e} and discarding the error therefore removes the information callers need to fix their configuration. An independent probe using https://foo..bar:1443 returned only `invalid TLS configuration: transport error` with no Status source, although the original tonic error contained InvalidDnsNameError. Preserve the typed source or, at minimum, include tonic's Debug representation in the message. Add a failing-configuration test that verifies the underlying cause remains observable.
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…points do not panic create_channel let tonic take the TLS server name from Uri::host, which keeps the brackets of an IPv6 literal ([2001:db8::1]). rustls rejects that as a server name, so tls_config(..).expect(..) panicked for every IPv6 evonode endpoint, and the explicit-CA path did the same. The host is now always passed without brackets through domain_name, and a TLS configuration error is returned as a transport error instead of panicking. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
DapiClient::with_proxy(Socks5Proxy) makes every connection of the client go through a SOCKS5 proxy (RFC 1928), over TCP or a Unix socket, with no fallback to a direct connection. The evonode's host goes to the proxy unresolved, so no endpoint is ever resolved locally, and TLS still runs end to end with the evonode and is validated against the endpoint host. Native only; wasm is unchanged. Socks5Auth::RandomPerConnection sends fresh random credentials on every new connection, so Tor (IsolateSOCKSAuth) builds a separate circuit for each. With credentials the client offers both no-auth and username/password, so a proxy that only allows no-auth still works. A failure on the proxy's side (unreachable, not accepting the connection or not answering the SOCKS5 greeting within 5 s, SOCKS protocol or auth error, general failure, unsupported command) carries a ProxyError in the tonic status source chain. CanRetry returns false for it, so it is neither retried nor held against the node, and TransportError::is_proxy_failure reports it. Tor also sends a general failure when one circuit fails; the request then fails at once and the next one gets a fresh circuit. Replies about the destination (host or network unreachable, refused, TTL expired, not allowed by ruleset, which is how Tor reports exit policy refusals, and address type not supported) and a connect timeout after the proxy answered the greeting (a CONNECT reply held while Tor builds a circuit, or a slow TLS handshake) stay ordinary retryable failures that ban the node as before. TransportError::clone now keeps the status source so the marker survives. With a proxy and no connect timeout, channels get a 20 s connect timeout (tonic applies it around the SOCKS5 handshake and TLS). The proxy is part of the connection pool key (endpoint, auth kind and username, never the password). Adds tokio-socks 0.5.3 (MIT), whose dependencies are all already in the tree. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Passes a SOCKS5 proxy to the DapiClient the builder creates, the way with_ca_certificate passes the CA. Native only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A real DapiClient sends GetStatus through a minimal in-test SOCKS5 server to a TLS gRPC server that serves no methods, so Unimplemented proves TCP, SOCKS5, TLS, HTTP/2 and gRPC all ran through the tunnel. Covers TLS validation through the proxy, fresh random credentials per connection, a no-auth-only proxy, IPv6 literals (ATYP 4), names resolved by the proxy (ATYP 3), a proxy that is down (not retried, nothing banned), a proxy that never answers the greeting (the proxy's failure, within 5 s), a proxy that answers but holds the CONNECT reply (the node's, after the connect timeout), a proxy's general failure versus a node refusal (only the refusal bans), and a Unix-socket proxy. The tests bind loopback ports. The test certificates are a throwaway CA and a server certificate for 127.0.0.1, ::1 and localhost; tests/data/proxy/README.md has the commands that made them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… config error's cause Through a SOCKS5 proxy the connector got the whole connect budget and TLS then started a second one of the same length, so a delayed CONNECT followed by a stalled handshake could take twice `connect_timeout`. The channel's own connect timeout now covers the tunnel and TLS together; the connector fixes its phase deadlines when it is called, before tonic's clock starts, so a stuck proxy is still reported as a ProxyError. An invalid TLS configuration now keeps tonic's cause (for example the invalid DNS name) in the status message and source chain instead of only "transport error". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
Verified the complete diff at 6109d6e and confirmed that all five prior findings are fixed. Three non-consensus suggestions remain: ambiguous proxy pool keys, loss of typed TLS error sources through client constructors, and panic-capable credential generation. Validation was static only; Rust workspace tests and Kotlin SDK build/tests were queued in the supplied CI snapshot.
🟡 3 suggestion(s)
1 finding(s) not shown inline (the lines are not part of this PR's diff)
🟡 Suggestion: Preserve the TLS configuration source through the transport constructors
packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/grpc.rs:59-62
The new invalid_tls_config helper attaches tonic's typed transport error to its Status, but this constructor immediately formats the TransportError and creates a fresh Status without a source. The Core constructor and both with_uri paths do the same. DapiClient::execute uses these constructors, so ordinary DAPI and SDK callers retain the readable diagnostic but cannot traverse or downcast the original error, despite the newly implemented source preservation. The regression test calls create_channel directly and misses this boundary. Forward the existing Status in all four channel-creation error branches and add constructor- or executor-level coverage using an invalid TLS server name.
Err(TransportError::Grpc(status)) => Err(status),
source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general, rust-quality); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: rust-quality)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 7: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 8: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 9: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 10: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
normalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — The change is substantial and intricate, but primarily adds client-side proxy transport orchestration using an existing SOCKS5 implementation rather than changing consensus, funds handling, cryptography, peer-facing network deserialization, or storage migrations. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity below 15% reserve: weekly 15% left, 5h 100% left),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/proxy.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/proxy.rs:138-146: Encode proxy pool-key fields without ambiguous delimiters
The endpoint and authentication fields are concatenated with unescaped spaces, but Unix socket paths and SOCKS usernames can contain spaces. Unix endpoint `/tmp/p password bob` with username `alice` and endpoint `/tmp/p` with username `bob password alice`, using the same password, produce the same key. Additionally, the endpoint's Display implementation uses Path::display(), which replaces invalid UTF-8 and can conflate distinct native paths. With the same destination and other settings, ConnectionPool returns the previously cached channel instead of constructing the newly configured connector; cloned DapiClients share that pool. Use a structured key or an unambiguous encoding that preserves field boundaries and native path bytes, and add regression coverage for both collision cases.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/proxy.rs:300-304: Propagate OS randomness failures instead of panicking during connection establishment
The locked rand_core 0.6.4 implementation of OsRng::fill_bytes panics when its underlying randomness request fails. RandomPerConnection invokes this helper inside the lazy connector, so an OS randomness failure panics the connection task instead of returning through the connector's Result and ProxyError attribution path. This is an uncommon external failure, not a guaranteed invariant. Make random_credential fallible with try_fill_bytes and propagate the error through proxy_error before SOCKS authentication. Keep generation fail-closed rather than substituting fixed credentials, and cover the error path with an injectable failing RNG.
In `packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/grpc.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-dapi-client/src/transport/grpc.rs:59-62: Preserve the TLS configuration source through the transport constructors
The new invalid_tls_config helper attaches tonic's typed transport error to its Status, but this constructor immediately formats the TransportError and creates a fresh Status without a source. The Core constructor and both with_uri paths do the same. DapiClient::execute uses these constructors, so ordinary DAPI and SDK callers retain the readable diagnostic but cannot traverse or downcast the original error, despite the newly implemented source preservation. The regression test calls create_channel directly and misses this boundary. Forward the existing Status in all four channel-creation error branches and add constructor- or executor-level coverage using an invalid TLS server name.
| pub(crate) fn connection_key(&self) -> String { | ||
| let auth = match &self.auth { | ||
| Socks5Auth::None => "none".to_string(), | ||
| Socks5Auth::Password { username, password } => { | ||
| format!("password {username} {:016x}", password_identity(password)) | ||
| } | ||
| Socks5Auth::RandomPerConnection => "random".to_string(), | ||
| }; | ||
| format!("{} {auth}", self.endpoint) |
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🟡 Suggestion: Encode proxy pool-key fields without ambiguous delimiters
The endpoint and authentication fields are concatenated with unescaped spaces, but Unix socket paths and SOCKS usernames can contain spaces. Unix endpoint /tmp/p password bob with username alice and endpoint /tmp/p with username bob password alice, using the same password, produce the same key. Additionally, the endpoint's Display implementation uses Path::display(), which replaces invalid UTF-8 and can conflate distinct native paths. With the same destination and other settings, ConnectionPool returns the previously cached channel instead of constructing the newly configured connector; cloned DapiClients share that pool. Use a structured key or an unambiguous encoding that preserves field boundaries and native path bytes, and add regression coverage for both collision cases.
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: rust-quality)
| /// 16 random bytes, hex encoded. | ||
| fn random_credential() -> String { | ||
| let mut bytes = [0u8; 16]; | ||
| rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes); | ||
| bytes.iter().map(|byte| format!("{byte:02x}")).collect() |
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🟡 Suggestion: Propagate OS randomness failures instead of panicking during connection establishment
The locked rand_core 0.6.4 implementation of OsRng::fill_bytes panics when its underlying randomness request fails. RandomPerConnection invokes this helper inside the lazy connector, so an OS randomness failure panics the connection task instead of returning through the connector's Result and ProxyError attribution path. This is an uncommon external failure, not a guaranteed invariant. Make random_credential fallible with try_fill_bytes and propagate the error through proxy_error before SOCKS authentication. Keep generation fail-closed rather than substituting fixed credentials, and cover the error path with an injectable failing RNG.
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: rust-quality)
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Issue being fixed or feature implemented
Dash Core's DashPay GUI (dashpay/dash#7512) talks to Dash Platform through
dash-platform-cxx(#4633), which goes throughrs-dapi-client. Dash Core users can route all their traffic through a proxy, usually Tor, with-proxy,-onionand-proxyrandomize. The current GUI draft refuses to enable DashPay while a proxy is set, because DAPI connections can only be made directly:create_channelbuilds a plain tonic channel with no proxy option. Users want the proxy to apply instead.rs-dapi-clientis the only place inrs-sdk,rs-dapi-clientand the shell that opens sockets, so proxy support belongs there. Every consumer (the cxx shell,rs-sdk-ffifor Swift and the JNI SDK for Kotlin) gets it throughDapiClientandSdkBuilder.While working on this I also found that
create_channelpanics today on every IPv6 evonode endpoint, with or without a proxy. The first commit fixes that on its own and can be split out if you prefer.What was done?
Five commits:
fix(sdk): IPv6 endpoints no longer panic. tonic took the TLS server name fromUri::host, which keeps the brackets of an IPv6 literal ([2001:db8::1]). rustls rejects that as a server name, sotls_config(..).expect(..)panicked, and the explicit-CA path did the same. The host is now always passed without brackets throughdomain_name. A TLS configuration error is now returned as a transport error instead of panicking.feat(sdk): SOCKS5 proxy inrs-dapi-client. This is the newtransport/proxy.rs, native only (cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))). wasm is unchanged.Public API:
Socks5Proxy { endpoint: ProxyEndpoint::{Tcp(SocketAddr), Unix(PathBuf)}, auth: Socks5Auth::{None, Password{..}, RandomPerConnection} }DapiClient::with_proxyAppliedRequestSettings::with_proxyTransportError::is_proxy_failure()ProxyErrorThe proxy follows the path
ca_certificatealready takes:DapiClientholds it andexecuteputs it into the applied settings. It is not inRequestSettings, which isCopyand set per request. Notokio-sockstype appears in the public API.create_channelbuilds the channel withconnect_with_connector_lazy(Socks5Connector)when a proxy is set.RandomPerConnectionsends 16 random bytes (hex) as the username and as the password on every new connection, so Tor (IsolateSOCKSAuth, on by default) builds a separate circuit for each. With credentials the client offers both no-auth and username/password, like Dash Core, so a proxy that allows only no-auth still works.Proxy failures never ban a node. Some failures are the proxy's own:
A proxy that accepts the TCP connection but does not answer the SOCKS5 greeting within 5 s (Dash Core's default
-timeout) is also the proxy's failure.These carry a
ProxyErrorin the tonicStatussource chain.CanRetry for Statusreturnsfalsefor them, so they are not retried and the node is not banned. Every endpoint shares the proxy, the same way Dash Core does not count a proxy failure against a peer.Other outcomes are about the destination:
These stay ordinary retryable errors and ban the node as before.
TransportError::clonenow usesStatus::clone, which keeps the source, so the marker survives the executor's clone.With a proxy and no
connect_timeout, channels get a 20 s connect timeout. tonic applies it around the SOCKS5 handshake and TLS together, as one deadline for the whole connection, while a request's deadline only starts once connected, so a proxy that accepts TCP and never answers would otherwise hang the request. The connector times its own phases against the same budget, from a start no later than tonic's, so a stuck proxy is still reported as aProxyErrorbefore that deadline fires.connection_keyincludes the proxy: endpoint, auth kind, username and, for a fixed password, a process-local keyed hash of it (never the password itself), so two passwords never share a pooled channel. A proxied channel and a direct channel to the same node never share a pool entry.TransportClient::with_uri, which takes no settings and has no non-test caller, is documented as connecting directly.feat(sdk):SdkBuilder::with_proxy, passed to theDapiClientinbuild()like the CA certificate. Its docs note that Core RPC forwith_coreis not proxied.test(sdk): end-to-end suite on loopback (see below).fix(sdk): one connect deadline for the tunnel and TLS, and an invalid TLS configuration keeps tonic's cause (for example the invalid DNS name) in the status message and source chain. Before this, TLS started a second fullconnect_timeoutafter the tunnel.Dependency:
tokio-socks 0.5.3(MIT, native target only; not needed on wasm, andcargo tree --target wasm32-unknown-unknowndoes not include it).unsafeand has no RustSec advisory.either,futures-util,thiserror 1,tokio) are already in the workspace, soCargo.lockgains exactly one package.AsyncRead + AsyncWritesocket, so TCP and Unix proxies share one code path.hyper-utilandtower-serviceare added as direct native dependencies. Both are already in the tree through tonic.Alternatives considered:
hyper-util's built-in
SocksV5would add no crate. In the locked 0.1.20 it has three bugs:Its error types are private, so telling a proxy failure from a node failure would mean matching strings. The parsing fix shipped only in 0.1.21 (2026-09-24), which also raises the MSRV.
A hand-written client of about 120 lines, mirroring Dash Core's
Socks5(), needs no dependency. If you would rather not add a crate, I can switch to it without changing the public API.How Has This Been Tested?
packages/rs-dapi-client/tests/socks5_proxy.rs, 14 tests. A realDapiClientsendsGetStatusthrough a minimal in-test SOCKS5 server to a tonic TLS server that serves no methods. AnUnimplementedanswer therefore proves that TCP, SOCKS5, TLS, HTTP/2 and gRPC all ran through the tunnel. The certificates are a throwaway CA plus a server certificate for127.0.0.1,::1andlocalhost;tests/data/proxy/README.mdhas the commands that made them.invalid peer certificate, and that failure is not treated as a proxy failure.[0x00, 0x02].is_proxy_failure(), not retryable, one attempt withretries: 2, and no address banned.Unit tests:
create_channelwith an IPv6 URI: default roots, explicit CA, proxy.Debugredacts the password.InvalidArgumentthat names the cause and keeps tonic's error as its source.connection_keydiffers with and without a proxy and between fixed passwords, and never contains the password.clone.DapiClient::with_proxyandSdkBuilder::with_proxyreach the client.The tests bind loopback ports.
Results:
cargo test -p rs-dapi-client --all-features: every suite passes (156 unit tests, 14 SOCKS5), onv5.0-devat99bc968a5c, together with the request-deadline and stalled-response-body suites fix(sdk): bound each DAPI request attempt, including the response body #4973 added.cargo test -p dash-sdk --lib with_proxypasses.cargo clippy -p rs-dapi-client -p dash-sdk --all-targets --all-features -- -D warningsandcargo fmt --check.cargo check -p rs-dapi-client --target wasm32-unknown-unknownandcargo check -p dash-sdk --no-default-featuresbuild.dash-platform-cxx) is stacked on this branch and passes its full suite on top of it.A manual testnet check through Tor with dash-qt (only proxy sockets open, separate circuits per evonode, no bans while Tor is stopped) will run on the Dash Core side once #4633 and the Core stack are re-pinned.
Breaking Changes
No behavior change without a proxy. There is one source-level change:
AppliedRequestSettingsgains a publicproxyfield next toca_certificate, so code that builds it with a struct literal needsproxy: None, asrs-dapi-client's owntests/rate_limit_ban.rsdoes. #2997 addedmax_decoding_message_sizeto the same struct the same way without!, so the title follows that precedent. Tell me if you want!.Checklist:
structure.rs, regeneratedgrovedb-structure.json, and checked the structure viewer link posted on this pull requestFor repository code-owners and collaborators only
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6109d6e/self-reviewedCargo.lock,packages/rs-dapi-client/Cargo.toml,packages/rs-dapi-client/src/dapi_client.rsand 11 more) — QuantumExplorer or shumkovrust-sdk(packages/rs-sdk/src/sdk.rs) — lklimek or shumkovWhen every merge requirement is met, the
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