🚨 Runner-Guard Security Finding
Rule: RGS-012 — Secret Exfiltration via Outbound HTTP Request
Severity: High
File: .github/workflows/daily-byok-ollama-test.lock.yml
Line: 488 (also recurs at lines 496, 501 — 3 occurrences in this file)
Description
A run: block contains an outbound HTTP request command (curl, wget, httpie, python requests, node fetch, etc.) targeting a non-GitHub domain (i.e., not github.com, api.github.com, or ghcr.io) in a job context that has access to secrets or publishing capabilities. This pattern is a strong indicator of credential exfiltration — the primary objective of most GitHub Actions supply-chain attacks.
Impact
Attackers who achieve code execution in a CI runner (via expression injection, fork checkout, compromised action, etc.) need a way to exfiltrate stolen secrets to infrastructure they control. The most common method is an HTTP POST request to an attacker-owned domain carrying environment variables, secret values, or tokens as the request body. The combination of external HTTP requests with secrets access in a workflow is a high-confidence indicator worth manual review.
Investigation note: the flagged steps download and run the official Ollama install script from a GitHub Releases URL (https://github.com/ollama/ollama/releases/download/..., verified via sha256sum -c) and poll `(localhost/redacted) (the local Ollama service). Neither pattern matches secret exfiltration — this looks like a likely false positive from the rule's non-GitHub-domain heuristic combined with the job's secrets access. Still worth confirming no secret material can reach these commands.
Remediation
- Confirm the job/step does not have unnecessary secrets exposure (scope
secrets:/env: to only what's required).
- If confirmed benign (install-script + checksum verification, localhost-only traffic), add a scoped runner-guard suppression with a justification comment.
- Continue verifying third-party install scripts via checksum (already done here) as a baseline mitigation against supply-chain tampering.
Detected by runner-guard v2.6.0 — CI/CD source-to-sink vulnerability scanner
Workflow run: https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/31460155227
Generated by 📊 Static Analysis Report · agent · 150.9 AIC · ⌖ 33.6 AIC · ⊞ 11K · ◷
🚨 Runner-Guard Security Finding
Rule: RGS-012 — Secret Exfiltration via Outbound HTTP Request
Severity: High
File:
.github/workflows/daily-byok-ollama-test.lock.ymlLine: 488 (also recurs at lines 496, 501 — 3 occurrences in this file)
Description
A
run:block contains an outbound HTTP request command (curl, wget, httpie, python requests, node fetch, etc.) targeting a non-GitHub domain (i.e., not github.com, api.github.com, or ghcr.io) in a job context that has access to secrets or publishing capabilities. This pattern is a strong indicator of credential exfiltration — the primary objective of most GitHub Actions supply-chain attacks.Impact
Attackers who achieve code execution in a CI runner (via expression injection, fork checkout, compromised action, etc.) need a way to exfiltrate stolen secrets to infrastructure they control. The most common method is an HTTP POST request to an attacker-owned domain carrying environment variables, secret values, or tokens as the request body. The combination of external HTTP requests with secrets access in a workflow is a high-confidence indicator worth manual review.
Investigation note: the flagged steps download and run the official Ollama install script from a GitHub Releases URL (
https://github.com/ollama/ollama/releases/download/..., verified viasha256sum -c) and poll `(localhost/redacted) (the local Ollama service). Neither pattern matches secret exfiltration — this looks like a likely false positive from the rule's non-GitHub-domain heuristic combined with the job's secrets access. Still worth confirming no secret material can reach these commands.Remediation
secrets:/env:to only what's required).Detected by runner-guard v2.6.0 — CI/CD source-to-sink vulnerability scanner
Workflow run: https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/31460155227