fix silent integer overflow and truncation of Uid/Gid#79175
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This PR (HEAD: 2ab781f) has been imported to Gerrit for code review. Please visit Gerrit at https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/773600. Important tips:
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Message from Gopher Robot: Patch Set 1: (1 comment) Please don’t reply on this GitHub thread. Visit golang.org/cl/773600. |
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This patch cleans up a dangerous integer arithmetic issue in
archive/tar/reader.go.When parsing
UidandGidfrom a tar header (both V7/USTAR headers and PAX extended headers), the parser reads the values asint64but explicitly casts them to a nativeint(e.g.,hdr.Uid = int(id64)).On 32-bit architectures, this results in a silent integer overflow. An attacker could craft a malicious archive with a$2^{32}$ ). Due to the overflow, this silently truncates to
Uidof4294967296(0. If an extraction tool trusts theHeader.Uidfield, this leads directly to a Privilege Escalation vulnerability, as the malicious file will be extracted withroot(UID 0) ownership instead of the intended user.To fix this, the patch introduces strict boundary checks (e.g.,
if int64(int(uid)) != uid). If the 64-bit ID cannot safely fit into a nativeintwithout truncation, the parser now fails closed by setting the error toErrHeader. This eliminates the error-prone pattern of blind casting and prevents the exploitable overflow entirely.