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Disable Save when editing another user's shared workflow in multiuser mode - #120

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copilot/disable-save-command-workflow
Mar 6, 2026
Merged

Disable Save when editing another user's shared workflow in multiuser mode#120
lstein merged 2 commits into
lstein/feature/workflow-isolation-in-multiuser-modefrom
copilot/disable-save-command-workflow

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Copilot AI commented Mar 6, 2026 •
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Summary

In multiuser mode, the "Save" button and menu item remained enabled when a user loaded another user's shared workflow and made edits — clicking Save would fail with a toast error rather than being blocked at the UI level.

Root cause: Save buttons only checked doesWorkflowHaveUnsavedChanges, with no ownership guard.

Fix: Added a useIsCurrentWorkflowOwner hook and wired it into all three Save entry points.

  • New hook: useIsCurrentWorkflowOwner

    • Single-user mode → always true (no ownership concept)
    • No workflow ID (unsaved/new workflow) → true (Save routes to Save As anyway)
    • Multiuser mode + library workflow → true only for owner or admin, false otherwise
    • Uses existing RTK Query cache from useGetWorkflowQuery — no extra API calls

  • Updated components (all add || !isCurrentWorkflowOwner to isDisabled):

    • WorkflowLibraryMenu/SaveWorkflowMenuItem.tsx — the "..." menu item
    • TopPanel/SaveWorkflowButton.tsx — floppy disk icon in the top panel
    • WorkflowListMenu/SaveWorkflowButton.tsx — floppy disk icon in the side panel; also added the missing doesWorkflowHaveUnsavedChanges guard for consistency with the other two buttons

Related Issues / Discussions

QA Instructions

Requires a multiuser-enabled InvokeAI instance.

  1. Log in as User A, create and share a workflow.
  2. Log in as User B, open User A's shared workflow from the Workflow Library.
  3. Make edits to the workflow.
  4. Verify the Save floppy disk icon and the Save item in the "..." menu are both disabled.
  5. Verify Save Workflow As… in the "..." menu remains enabled and works correctly.
  6. Log back in as User A; verify Save is enabled normally for their own workflow.

Merge Plan

Checklist

  • The PR has a short but descriptive title, suitable for a changelog
  • Tests added / updated (if applicable)
  • ❗Changes to a redux slice have a corresponding migration
  • Documentation added / updated (if applicable)
  • Updated What's New copy (if doing a release after this PR)
Original prompt

This section details on the original issue you should resolve

<issue_title>[bug]: Disable "Save" command when editing another user's shared workflow</issue_title>
<issue_description>### Is there an existing issue for this problem?

  • I have searched the existing issues

Install method

Invoke's Launcher

Operating system

Linux

GPU vendor

Nvidia (CUDA)

GPU model

No response

GPU VRAM

No response

Version number

lstein/feature/workflow-isolation-in-multiuser-mode

Browser

No response

System Information

No response

What happened

In the Workflow Library page, I loaded another user's shared workflow, made some edits and then selected "Save" from the "..." menu. It gave me the expected error message "Problem saving workflow". The error message is correct, but in fact the UI should have prevented me from selecting "Save".

What you expected to happen

I expect the "Save" menu item and the Save floppy disk icon to be disabled when I have am editing a shared workflow created by another user. Save Workflow As... should work, hower, as it already does.

How to reproduce the problem

No response

Additional context

No response

Discord username

No response</issue_description>

Comments on the Issue (you are @copilot in this section)

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@lstein
Disable Save when editing another user's shared workflow in multiuser…
856e490 
… mode

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>
Copilot AI changed the title [WIP] Fix disable 'Save' command on shared workflows Disable Save when editing another user's shared workflow in multiuser mode Mar 6, 2026
lstein
lstein approved these changes Mar 6, 2026
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Works as advertised.

@lstein
lstein marked this pull request as ready for review March 6, 2026 15:53
@lstein
lstein merged commit b37bc8d into lstein/feature/workflow-isolation-in-multiuser-mode Mar 6, 2026
25 checks passed
@lstein
lstein deleted the copilot/disable-save-command-workflow branch March 6, 2026 15:58
lstein added a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 25, 2026
@lstein
@claude @JPPhoto
Feature: Shared/private workflows and image boards in multiuser mode (i…
33ec16d 
…nvoke-ai#9018)

* feat: Per-user workflow libraries in multiuser mode (#114)

* Add per-user workflow isolation: migration 28, service updates, router ownership checks, is_public endpoint, schema regeneration, frontend UI

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat: add shared workflow checkbox to Details panel, auto-tag, gate edit/delete, fix tests

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* Restrict model sync to admin users only (#118)

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat: distinct splash screens for admin/non-admin users in multiuser mode (#116)

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* Disable Save when editing another user's shared workflow in multiuser mode (#120)

* Disable Save when editing another user's shared workflow in multiuser mode

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore(app): ruff

* Add board visibility (private/shared/public) feature with tests and UI

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* Enforce read-only access for non-owners of shared/public boards in UI

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* Fix remaining board access enforcement: invoke icon, drag-out, change-board filter, archive

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: allow drag from shared boards to non-board targets (viewer, ref image, etc.)

Previously, images in shared boards owned by another user could not be
dragged at all — the draggable setup was completely skipped in
GalleryImage.tsx when canWriteImages was false. This blocked ALL drop
targets including the viewer, reference image pane, and canvas.

Now images are always draggable. The board-move restriction is enforced
in the dnd target isValid functions instead:
- addImageToBoardDndTarget: rejects moves from shared boards the user
  doesn't own (unless admin or board is public)
- removeImageFromBoardDndTarget: same check

Other drop targets (viewer, reference images, canvas, comparison, etc.)
remain fully functional for shared board images.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): add auth requirement to all sensitive routes in multimodal mode

* chore(backend): ruff

* fix (backend): improve user isolation for session queue and recall parameters

 - Sanitize session queue information of all cross-user fields except for the timestamps and status.
 - Recall parameters are now user-scoped.
 - Queue status endpoints now report user-scoped activity rather than global activity
 - Tests added:

  TestSessionQueueSanitization (4 tests):
  1. test_owner_sees_all_fields - Owner sees complete queue item data
  2. test_admin_sees_all_fields - Admin sees complete queue item data
  3. test_non_owner_sees_only_status_timestamps_errors -
     Non-owner sees only item_id, queue_id, status, and timestamps; everything else is redacted
  4. test_sanitization_does_not_mutate_original - Sanitization doesn't modify the original object

  TestRecallParametersIsolation (2 tests):

  5. test_user1_write_does_not_leak_to_user2 - User1's recall params are not visible in user2's client state
  6. test_two_users_independent_state - Both users can write recall params independently without overwriting each other

fix(backend): queue status endpoints report user-scoped stats rather than global stats

* fix(workflow): do not filter default workflows in multiuser mode

  Problem: When categories=['user', 'default'] (or no category filter)
  and user_id was set for multiuser scoping, the SQL query became
     WHERE category IN ('user', 'default') AND user_id = ?,
     which  excluded default workflows (owned by "system").

  Fix: Changed user_id = ? to (user_id = ? OR category = 'default') in
  all 6 occurrences across workflow_records_sqlite.py — in get_many,
  counts_by_category, counts_by_tag, and get_all_tags. Default
  workflows are now always visible regardless of user scoping.

  Tests added (2):
  - test_default_workflows_visible_when_listing_user_and_default — categories=['user','default'] includes both
  - test_default_workflows_visible_when_no_category_filter — no filter still shows defaults

* fix(multiuser): scope queue/recall/intermediates endpoints to current user

Several read-only and event-emitting endpoints were leaking aggregate
cross-user activity in multiuser mode:

- recall_parameters_updated event was broadcast to every queue
  subscriber. Added user_id to the event and routed it to the owner +
  admin rooms only.
- get_queue_status, get_batch_status, counts_by_destination and
  get_intermediates_count now scope counts to the calling user
  (admins still see global state). Removed the now-redundant
  user_pending/user_in_progress fields and simplified QueueCountBadge.
- get_queue_status hides current item_id/session_id/batch_id when the
  current item belongs to another user.

Also fixes test_session_queue_sanitization assertions that lagged
behind the recently expanded redaction set.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(backend): ruff

* fix(multiuser): reject anonymous websockets and scope queue item events

Close three cross-user leaks in the websocket layer:

- _handle_connect() now rejects connections without a valid JWT in
  multiuser mode (previously fell through to user_id="system"), so
  anonymous clients can no longer subscribe to queue rooms and observe
  other users' activity. In single-user mode it still accepts as system
  admin.
- _handle_sub_queue() no longer silently falls back to the system user
  for an unknown sid in multiuser mode; it refuses the subscription.
- QueueItemStatusChangedEvent and BatchEnqueuedEvent are now routed to
  user:{user_id} + admin rooms instead of the full queue room. Both
  events carry unsanitized user_id, batch_id, origin, destination,
  session_id, and error metadata and must not be broadcast.
- BatchEnqueuedEvent gains a user_id field; emit_batch_enqueued and
  enqueue_batch thread it through.

New TestWebSocketAuth suite covers connect accept/reject for both
modes, sub_queue refusal, and private routing of the queue item and
batch events (plus a QueueClearedEvent sanity check).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(multiuser): verify user record on websocket connect

A deleted or deactivated user with an unexpired JWT could still open a
websocket and subscribe to queue rooms. Now _handle_connect() checks the
backing user record (exists + is_active) in multiuser mode, mirroring
the REST auth path in auth_dependencies.py. Fails closed if the user
service is unavailable.

Tests: added deleted-user and inactive-user rejection tests; updated
valid-token test to create the user in the database first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(multiuser): close bulk download cross-user exfiltration path

Backend:
- POST /download now validates image read access (per-image) and board
  read access (per-board) before queuing the download.
- GET /download/{name} is intentionally unauthenticated because the
  browser triggers it via <a download> which cannot carry Authorization
  headers. Access control relies on POST-time checks, UUID filename
  unguessability, private socket event routing, and single-fetch deletion.
- Added _assert_board_read_access() helper to images router.
- Threaded user_id through bulk download handler, base class, event
  emission, and BulkDownloadEventBase so events carry the initiator.
- Bulk download service now tracks download ownership via _download_owners
  dict (cleaned up on delete).
- Socket bulk_download room subscription restricted to authenticated
  sockets in multiuser mode.
- Added error-catching in FastAPIEventService._dispatch_from_queue to
  prevent silent event dispatch failures.

Frontend:
- Fixed pre-existing race condition where the "Preparing Download" toast
  from the POST response overwrote the "Ready to Download" toast from the
  socket event (background task completes in ~17ms, so the socket event
  can arrive before Redux processes the HTTP response). Toast IDs are now
  distinct: "preparing:{name}" vs "{name}".
- bulk_download_complete/error handlers now dismiss the preparing toast.

Tests (8 new):
- Bulk download by image names rejected for non-owner (403)
- Bulk download by image names allowed for owner (202)
- Bulk download from private board rejected (403)
- Bulk download from shared board allowed (202)
- Admin can bulk download any images (202)
- Bulk download events carry user_id
- Bulk download event emitted to download room
- GET /download unauthenticated returns 404 for unknown files

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(multiuser): enforce board visibility on image listing endpoints

GET /api/v1/images?board_id=... and GET /api/v1/images/names?board_id=...
passed board_id directly to the SQL layer without checking board
visibility. The SQL only applied user_id filtering for board_id="none"
(uncategorized images), so any authenticated user who knew a private
board ID could enumerate its images.

Both endpoints now call _assert_board_read_access() before querying,
returning 403 unless the caller is the board owner, an admin, or the
board is Shared/Public.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(backend): ruff

* fix(multiuser): require image ownership when adding images to boards

add_image_to_board and add_images_to_board only checked write access to
the destination board, never verifying that the caller owned the source
image.  An attacker could add a victim's image to their own board, then
exploit the board-ownership fallback in _assert_image_owner to gain
delete/patch/star/unstar rights on the image.

Both endpoints now call _assert_image_direct_owner which requires direct
image ownership (image_records.user_id) or admin — board ownership is
intentionally not sufficient, preventing the escalation chain.

Also fixed a pre-existing bug where HTTPException from the inner loop in
add_images_to_board was caught by the outer except-Exception and returned
as 500 instead of propagating the correct status code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(backend): ruff

* fix(multiuser): validate image access in recall parameter resolution

The recall endpoint loaded image files and ran ControlNet preprocessors
on any image_name supplied in control_layers or ip_adapters without
checking that the caller could read the image.  An attacker who knew
another user's image UUID could extract dimensions and, for supported
preprocessors, mint a derived processed image they could then fetch.

Added _assert_recall_image_access() which validates read access for every
image referenced in the request before any resolution or processing
occurs.  Access is granted to the image owner, admins, or when the image
sits on a Shared/Public board.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(multiuser): require admin auth on model install job endpoints

list_model_installs, get_model_install_job, pause, resume,
restart_failed, and restart_file were unauthenticated — any caller who
could reach the API could view sensitive install job fields (source,
local_path, error_traceback) and interfere with installation state.

All six endpoints now require AdminUserOrDefault, consistent with the
neighboring cancel and prune routes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(multiuser): close bulk download exfiltration and additional review findings

Bulk download capability token exfiltration:
- Socket events now route to user:{user_id} + admin rooms instead of the
  shared 'default' room (the earlier toast race that blocked this approach
  was fixed in a prior commit).
- GET /download/{name} re-requires CurrentUserOrDefault and enforces
  ownership via get_owner().
- Frontend download handler replaced <a download> (which cannot carry auth
  headers) with fetch() + Authorization header + programmatic blob download.

Additional fixes from reviewer tests:
- Public boards now grant write access in _assert_board_write_access and
  mutation rights in _assert_image_owner (BoardVisibility.Public).
- Uncategorized image listing (GET /boards/none/image_names) now filters
  to the caller's images only, preventing cross-user enumeration.
- board_images router uses board_image_records.get_board_for_image()
  instead of images.get_dto() to avoid dependency on image_files service.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(multiuser): add user_id scoping to workflow SQL mutations

Defense-in-depth: the route layer already checks ownership before
calling update/delete/update_is_public/update_opened_at, but the SQL
statements did not include AND user_id = ?, so a bypass of the route
check would allow cross-user mutations.

All four methods now accept an optional user_id parameter.  When
provided, the SQL WHERE clause is scoped to that user.  The route layer
passes current_user.user_id for non-admin callers and None for admins.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(multiuser): allow non-owner uploads to public boards

upload_image() blocked non-owner uploads even to public boards.  The
board write check now allows uploads when board_visibility is Public,
consistent with the public-board semantics in _assert_board_write_access
and _assert_image_owner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonathan <34005131+JPPhoto@users.noreply.github.com>
lstein added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 6, 2026
@JPPhoto
@lstein @claude @Pfannkuchensack
Feature: Add the ability to call a saved workflow from another (invok…
4ea04f6 
…e-ai#9093)

* feat: Per-user workflow libraries in multiuser mode (#114)

* Add per-user workflow isolation: migration 28, service updates, router ownership checks, is_public endpoint, schema regeneration, frontend UI

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat: add shared workflow checkbox to Details panel, auto-tag, gate edit/delete, fix tests

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* Restrict model sync to admin users only (#118)

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat: distinct splash screens for admin/non-admin users in multiuser mode (#116)

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* Disable Save when editing another user's shared workflow in multiuser mode (#120)

* Disable Save when editing another user's shared workflow in multiuser mode

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore(app): ruff

* Add board visibility (private/shared/public) feature with tests and UI

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* Enforce read-only access for non-owners of shared/public boards in UI

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* Fix remaining board access enforcement: invoke icon, drag-out, change-board filter, archive

Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: allow drag from shared boards to non-board targets (viewer, ref image, etc.)

Previously, images in shared boards owned by another user could not be
dragged at all — the draggable setup was completely skipped in
GalleryImage.tsx when canWriteImages was false. This blocked ALL drop
targets including the viewer, reference image pane, and canvas.

Now images are always draggable. The board-move restriction is enforced
in the dnd target isValid functions instead:
- addImageToBoardDndTarget: rejects moves from shared boards the user
  doesn't own (unless admin or board is public)
- removeImageFromBoardDndTarget: same check

Other drop targets (viewer, reference images, canvas, comparison, etc.)
remain fully functional for shared board images.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): add auth requirement to all sensitive routes in multimodal mode

* chore(backend): ruff

* Add workflow live update events

Stacked on top of origin PR invoke-ai#9018 (shared/private workflows and boards) for multiuser workflow visibility semantics.

* Add persisted call-saved-workflows node stub

* Add saved workflow picker state handling

* Clarify saved workflow missing state

* Validate selected saved workflows at runtime

* Generalize saved workflow picker into a field type

* Harden saved workflow field behavior

* Rename saved workflow node to singular

* Fix saved workflow frontend build issues

* Add dynamic saved workflow form fields

* Seed and handle dynamic workflow fields

* Align dynamic workflow fields with node styling

* Use standard templates for dynamic workflow fields

* Revert stale dynamic edge graph guard

* Preserve inbound edges when compatbile with a new selected workflow

* Add call saved workflow design document

* Clarify workflow return runtime design

* Add workflow return node contract

* Allow bounded recursive workflow calls

* fix (backend): improve user isolation for session queue and recall parameters

 - Sanitize session queue information of all cross-user fields except for the timestamps and status.
 - Recall parameters are now user-scoped.
 - Queue status endpoints now report user-scoped activity rather than global activity
 - Tests added:

  TestSessionQueueSanitization (4 tests):
  1. test_owner_sees_all_fields - Owner sees complete queue item data
  2. test_admin_sees_all_fields - Admin sees complete queue item data
  3. test_non_owner_sees_only_status_timestamps_errors -
     Non-owner sees only item_id, queue_id, status, and timestamps; everything else is redacted
  4. test_sanitization_does_not_mutate_original - Sanitization doesn't modify the original object

  TestRecallParametersIsolation (2 tests):

  5. test_user1_write_does_not_leak_to_user2 - User1's recall params are not visible in user2's client state
  6. test_two_users_independent_state - Both users can write recall params independently without overwriting each other

fix(backend): queue status endpoints report user-scoped stats rather than global stats

* fix(workflow): do not filter default workflows in multiuser mode

  Problem: When categories=['user', 'default'] (or no category filter)
  and user_id was set for multiuser scoping, the SQL query became
     WHERE category IN ('user', 'default') AND user_id = ?,
     which  excluded default workflows (owned by "system").

  Fix: Changed user_id = ? to (user_id = ? OR category = 'default') in
  all 6 occurrences across workflow_records_sqlite.py — in get_many,
  counts_by_category, counts_by_tag, and get_all_tags. Default
  workflows are now always visible regardless of user scoping.

  Tests added (2):
  - test_default_workflows_visible_when_listing_user_and_default — categories=['user','default'] includes both
  - test_default_workflows_visible_when_no_category_filter — no filter still shows defaults

* Fix frontend lint on workflow node fixtures

* Add workflow call runtime state scaffolding

* Add workflow call runner boundary handling

* Create child workflow execution state on call boundary

* Update workflow call runtime documentation

* Localize saved workflow node UI strings

* Execute saved workflow children inline

* chore: ruff

* Test inline saved workflow execution semantics

* Fix saved workflow lint and schema warnings

* Updated documentation

* Propagate workflow return values to callers

* Fix lazy If branch pruning and skipped-parent handling in graph runtime

* Extract workflow call coordinator

* Track workflow call lifecycle state

* Add workflow call queue item metadata

* Add workflow call queue item migration

* Queue child workflow executions and suspend parents

* Cascade workflow call cancel and root retry

* Refine workflow call queue UI and docs

* Harden workflow call queue API behavior

* Harden workflow call retry event delivery

* Extract workflow call runtime module

* Format workflow call queue migration

* Validate callable workflow compatibility

* Support direct batched child workflows

* Support generator-backed batched child workflows

* Split workflow call runtime tests

* Clarify workflow call batch semantics

* Expose callable workflow compatibility metadata

* Surface callable workflow compatibility in library UI

* Fix workflow call privacy and compatibility edge cases

* Harden workflow call queue boundary and cleanup semantics

* Harden workflow call cancel retry and batch edge cases

* Repaired database migration

* bring documentation back in line with the tested current state

* Harden saved workflow frontend compatibility state

* Treat waiting queue items as nonterminal in staging area

* chore: typegen

* Harden workflow call child propagation

* Tighten workflow call compatibility reporting

* Removed to-do items that have been done

* Update docs

* Documented `WorkflowCallQueueLifecycle` as an intentional bounded component

* Fix saved workflow selection fallback

* Fix workflow call startup cancellation

* Fix single-user workflow socket rooms

* Ignore stale saved workflow input payloads

* Fix saved workflow picker discovery

* Preserve workflow call batch field values

* chore: linting

* Harden workflow-call queue cancellation semantics

* Harden saved workflow caller UI state

* Avoid eager workflow compatibility expansion

* Fix workflow call README list nesting

* chore: mdformat

* Updated documentation

* Removed the anonymous collection from the workflow return production contract, fixed various bugs.

* chore: lint

* Remove noise in tests

* Bugfixes and optimization - workflow_return can now take a single or collection

* Bugfixes

* Fixed a persistence failure

* Fix saved workflow call field rehydration

* Preserve workflow call completion state on resume

* Update queue status from socket events

* Updated tests to match the current workflow-return contract

* Fix workflow child queue status isolation

* chore: typegen

* chore: typegen

* Fixed failing migration test

* Updated documentation to match schema

* Update call saved workflow design docs

* Renamed to follow current convention

* chore: typegen

* chore: openapi.json

* Fix tests

* chore: typegen

* chore: lint

* Fix workflow socket test async backend

* Test workflow call batch cancellation

* Address outstanding issues based on PR comments

* Test workflow call destination cancellation

Add the missing F2 regression test for destination-scoped bulk cancellation of workflow-call parent/child chains.

* Fix workflow call runtime test double

* chore: typegen/openapi

* chore: typegen/openapi

* Fixed database migration 33

* Update tests after queue status merge

* chore: lint

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lstein <111189+lstein@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lincoln Stein <lincoln.stein@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Alexander Eichhorn <alex@eichhorn.dev>
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